How can the United States take advantage of the great but tricky strategic opportunity that the fall of Bashar Assad’s tyranny in Damascus offers us? Mainly through a combination of meaningful incentives for, and credible threats against, our enemies, frenemies, allies and would-be friends. Let’s go down the list.
Syria
The large question hanging over our Syria policy is whether the rebel group chiefly responsible for toppling the Assad regime, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or Organization for the Liberation of the Levant, is sincere in its renunciation of terrorism and Taliban-style Islamism. The Biden administration can offer an immediate gesture of goodwill by lifting the State Department’s $10 million reward for Abu Mohammed al-Golani, the HTS leader.
But U.S. sanctions on Syria, and HTS’ status as a designated terrorist organization, should be lifted only on conditional bases. Will Syria’s new rulers allow freedom of worship for religious minorities and freedom of dress for women? Will they accept the de facto autonomy of Syria’s Kurds? Will they cooperate with international efforts to destroy the Islamic State group? If HTS really wants to cement a different relationship with Washington, it can also demand Russia’s military withdrawal from Syria, much as Egypt’s Anwar Sadat did in the 1970s.
Lebanon
“If we lose Syria, then we will no longer have Hezbollah.” That prediction about the terrorist militia came from Soheil Karimi, a hard-line Iranian commentator. Already decimated by Israel, Hezbollah will struggle to survive as Lebanon’s dominant political entity if it doesn’t have an easy way to rearm itself. It’s in the interests of Israel, the United States and the Lebanese people that Hezbollah’s 40-plus-year reign of ruin end.
How? The legal basis is full application of the U.N. Security Council’s Resolution 1701, which insists “there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese state.” Hezbollah has brazenly flouted the demand for 18 years. Donald Trump can help enforce it by declaring in one of his social media posts that he will not consider Israel bound to honor its ceasefire deal with Hezbollah until the group fully disarms.
Ultimately, Hezbollah should be put to a fundamental choice: Participate in Lebanese politics as a normal political party that plays by the rules or face further military humiliation at the hands of the Zionist enemy.
Iran
The Islamic republic is now enriching uranium to nearly weapons grade. As with President Joe Biden’s warnings to Hezbollah after Oct. 7, his message to Iran should be simple: Don’t.
As for the next Trump administration, it should present Iran with a choice — and a dare. The choice, to put it in the colloquial Trumpese, would go something like this: “IF IRAN’S EVIL LEADERS GO FOR NUKES, WE WILL GO AFTER THEM!” That is, the regime will put its own existence at risk if it attempts to dash toward a bomb. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, fresh from his many losses, will get the point.
The dare is also straightforward: Trump should propose what I’ve called “normalization for normalization” as a basis for improved ties with Iran. That is, America offers Iran full normalization of relations, including the lifting of economic sanctions and the reopening of embassies, in exchange for the normalization of Iranian foreign policy: a complete cessation of support for regional terror proxies like the Houthis and Hamas, and an irreversible and verifiable end to Iran’s nuclear program. Khamenei may reject the deal out of hand, since hostility to America lies at the core of the Islamic republic’s ideology, but it will give Iran’s people a standard to aspire to as they take heart from last week’s revolution in Damascus.
Gaza
In early September, I wrote a column opposing a hostage deal between Israel and Hamas. Part of my reasoning is that Israel could not afford to emerge from the war being perceived, at least by its enemies, as a loser. Since the killings of Hamas’ Yahya Sinwar and Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah, the devastating pager attacks, the destruction of most of Hezbollah’s arsenal and the toppling of Assad, things have changed.
Now that Israel is the war’s clear victor, it needs to bring its hostages home. Let Hamas try to rule from the ruins it made.
That doesn’t mean that Israel should cut a weak deal. Above all, it would be a mistake for Israel to agree to bring back the hostages in stages, since it would give Hamas an incentive to raise the price for every additional hostage. Trump can be especially helpful here by informing Hamas’ patrons in Qatar that the United States would revoke Qatar’s status as a major non-NATO ally and move the Al-Udeid air base — forward headquarters of the U.S. Central Command — to the United Arab Emirates if all of the hostages aren’t released by Jan. 20. Let the conniving Qataris figure out the rest.
Other players? The Turks will have to be deterred by Washington from trying to use Syria’s revolution as an opportunity to settle scores against the Kurds. That means, especially, maintaining our detachment of forces in eastern Syria. The Saudis will also need to demonstrate regional leadership by helping rebuild Syria and resuming negotiations for diplomatic normalization with Israel.
None of this will be simple or straightforward. But the end of Assad’s wretched regime unlocks many doors.
Bret Stephens is a New York Times columnist.